Patentable Discovery?
INTRODUCTION

As I sipped my second cup of coffee a woman came into my office.
She livened my morning with an exciting tale of her recent treasure
troving in the Pacific. While exploring the depths she came upon what
could only be the Lost City of Atlantis. Further exploration of Atlantis
disclosed an extremely efficient and powerful, non-polluting engine that
ran on sea-water. 1 With a background in mechanical engineering, the
intrepid explorer was able to deduce the principles on which the engine
operated and assured me she could reproduce the engine. My task is to
obtain a patent for her discovery.
Due to a mid-morning tee-time, I was unable to pursue this matter
until the following day. I had just opened Donald Chisum's treatise on
patents, to do some preliminary research, when a strange little man
bounded into my office chanting, "Fi fiddle dee dee, fi fiddle dee doe,
my name is Rumpelstiltskin you know."2 After this unique introduction, he explained that he could spin straw into gold, using an ordinary
spinning wheel and a secret incantation. Rumpelstiltskin requested that
I secure him a patent for his discovery. He wanted this knowledge
disseminated and his name known throughout the world. I assured him
that I would give it my best efforts, had him sign a retainer agreement,
and sent him on his merry way.
While puzzling over this little man and his remarkable discovery I
received a phone call from one of my firm's major clients, Ipso Facto
Pharmaceuticals. For the past two years Ipso Facto employed agents to
scour the globe collecting samples of various berries in hopes of finding
a cure for cancer. One agent recently returned with berries found on an
expedition to the northern reaches of Siberia. Testing revealed that the
berries contain a naturally occurring chemical that does in fact cure

I. We will assume that our explorer is the owner of the found engine and avoid
a digression into maritime law.
2. This hypothetical is loosely based on the tale of Rumpelstiltskin. GRIMM'S
FAIRY TALES TWENTY STORIES 39 (Viking Press 1973).
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cancer. 3 Ipso Facto Pharmaceuticals is eager to secure a patent for their
discovery, save millions of lives, and make billions of dollars. With
three new patent applications, it seemed I would be canceling my
weekend in Vegas.
The hypotheticals set forth above are of interest because they pertain
to discoveries, rather than inventions. My new clients did not create or
produce what they seek to patent; they base their patent applications on
knowledge they were the first to obtain. Are such discoveries patentable? In this comment I argue that, despite some decisions and dicta to
the contrary, the courts and the Patent Office should explicitly recognize
the patentability of discoveries that are not inventions, subject to the
same statutory constraints imposed on inventions.
l.

CONSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA

To determine whether discoveries that are not inventions should be
patentable we first look to the Constitution's grant of Congressional
authorization "[t]o promote the Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their ...
Discoveries.',4 The framers of the Constitution drafted a document that
would allow our new nation to prosper. They recognized the necessity
of inducements and incentives to ingenuity, despite the abuses that had
arisen under the English system of monopolies. 5 To analyze what this
constitutional grant entails requires a discussion of some of its terms,
specifically, "inventors," "discoveries," and "useful arts."

3. While this hypothetical is simplistic, in fact many of today's current
prescriptions contain drugs extracted from plants. Liz Hanellin, Protecting Plan/Derived Drugs: Patents and Beyond, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 169, 170 (1991).
Many commentators have addressed the issues involved in patenting discovered plantbased pharmaceuticals. See, e.g., id.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8. The clause in full reads: "To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing, for limited Times to Authors and Inventors, the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id. The balanced
construction of the clause indicates that it is really two provisions merged into one. The
first authorizes Congress to promote the progress of science by securing for limited times
to authors the exclusive right to their writings; and the other authorizes the promotion
of the progress of useful arts by securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive
right to their discoveries. E.g., I ERNEST B. LIPSCOMB III, LIBSCOMB'S WALKER ON
PATENTS § 2, at 73-80 n.l (3rd ed. 1984) [hereinafter LIPSCOMB].
5. Outline of the History of the United States Patent Office, XVIII J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y, Centennial Number at 66-67 (1956) [hereinafter Outline] (noting Thomas
Jefferson's original aversion toward any monopoly grant and subsequent realization of
the importance of limited monopolies to induce the advancement of society).
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A.

Inventors and Discoveries

Does the Constitution's authorization to "promote the progress of
useful arts" by giving "inventors" exclusive rights to their "discoveries,"
encompass granting "discoverers" exclusive rights to their "discoveries?"
At the time of the drafting of the Constitution an inventor was both an
inventor and a discoverer. 6 Since an inventor is also a discoverer, the
patent clause authorizes granting inventors and discoverers exclusive
rights to their discoveries. 7 Further, if the framers of the Constitution
intended to ignore the fact that an "inventor" was also a "discoverer" the
patent clause would not refer to the productions of inventors as
discoveries. 8 The Constitution's patent clause, in referring to "inventors," does not exclude "discoverers."
The Patent Office and courts often view discovery as something less
than invention. 9 However, it is "discoveries" that are specifically
protected in the constitution. 10 Presently, a person can invent (create
or produce for the first time) something new and obtain a patent on it,
but simply to discover (find or find out) something, without creating or
producing it for the first time, is unpatentable. 11 An invention is
something new that is created. A discovery is something new. Since
inventions are also "discoveries," the Constitution authorizes their
protection. This Comment argues that, while discoveries may not be
inventions, they are patentable, provided the conditions and requirements
of the Patent Act are met.

6. At that time, the term "inventor" carried two meanings: "One who finds or
finds out" and "one who created something new." Report of the Senate in 1930 relating
to Plant Patents, IV Legal Phases of the Bill, pertinent part reprinted in LIPSCOMB,
supra note 4, at 86-87. One who finds or finds out is a discoverer; one who creates
something new is an inventor.
7. As stated in the Senate Report, despite the present prevailing meaning of the
word "inventor" as a creator of something new "the meaning to be attached to the term
'inventor' as used in the Constitution must be the meaning in general use at the time [a
meaning that includes discoverer]." Id. at 87.
8. Id.
9. '"Quite clearly discovery is something less than invention."' Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,476 (1974) (quoting A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron
Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 1934)).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. See supra Section IV.
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B.

Promoting Progress of Usefal Arts

What did the framers mean by "useful arts," and why is the promotion
of their progress, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, "worth to the public
the embarrassment of an exclusive patent?" 12 Although "useful arts"
has been somewhat ambiguously defined, the term is generally considered synonymous with what we now think of as the technological arts,
those inventions or discoveries which further innovation. 13 The
Supreme Court paraphrased the philosophy of Thomas Jefferson on the
nature and purpose of the patent monopoly, writing: "Only inventions
and discoveries which furthered human knowledge, and were new and
useful, justified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly."14 This earned monopoly right is consistent with Jefferson's
philosophy that a property right in an invention or discovery was not a
natural right of the inventor or discoverer, but rather a creation of
society. 15 An invention or discovery is an idea exclusively possessed
only if it is withheld. 16 By its character, an invention or discovery,
once divulged, spreads to all without lessening what was previously
known to only one.17 Society can give an exclusive right to the profits
arising therefrom, to encourage the pursuit of useful ideas and the
furtherance of technology and innovation. However, the right is
society's to give and riot the inventor's or discoverer's to take. 18
C.

Promoting the Progress of the Usefal Arts Through Discovery

Under a Constitutional authorization to promote progress in useful arts,
should the courts deny patentability to discoveries that are not inventions? We address this question through our hypotheticals. Recall our
patent seekers' discoveries: a propulsion machine that runs on seawater; a method of spinning straw into gold utilizing a secret incantation;
and a chemical found in Siberian berries that cures cancer. The seawater engine is unique because it was originally created by another. Is
it still a technological advancement? While the technology did exist and
was known at some time in the past, it was lost to society. Its
12. Outline, supra note 5, at 69. Jefferson was one of the administrators of the
Patent Act of 1790 and influential in the drafting of the Patent Act of 1793. Id. at 64,
78.
13. I DONALDS. CHISUM, PATENTS Gl-23 (1988).
14. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 9 (1966).
15. Outline, supra note 5, at 69.
16. Id. at 68.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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reintroduction would further innovation by providing a starting point for
others to improve upon. Perhaps its disclosure would revolutionize all
the world's power sources. This appears to be precisely the type of
progress in the useful arts the framers were intending to encourage and
reward by authorizing the granting of patents.
The question remains, however, whether its rediscovery is worth the
public embarrassment of a limited private monopoly. 19 Should society
create a twenty-year exclusive right in the discoverer in exchange for the
knowledge she has obtained? Since treasure trovers seek treasures,
whether patentable or not, an incentive to treasure trove is unnecessary.
We seek to provide an incentive to disclose the discovery. While it is
possible another explorer would make this discovery within the next
twenty years, it seems unlikely.20 Would this discovery be disclosed
without the incentive of a patent? Our explorer could practice her
newfound discovery in secret and the world might never obtain the
benefit of this technology. More likely, she would sell to the highest
bidder, who would endeavor to protect the discovery as a trade secret. 21
Our skies would become more polluted and our dependence on foreign
19. The Patent Act provides the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the invention or discovery for a term of seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (West
I 988). Note that the term of patent protection has been amended as part of the United
States' adherence to GA TT to provide: "[S]uch grant shall be for a term beginning on
the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the
application is filed .... " Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 532,
108 Stat. 4809, 4984 (1994).
20. Note that the Supreme Court has stated: "If something is to be discovered at
all very likely it will be discovered by more than one person." Kewanee Oil v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470,490 (1974) (citing Singletons and Multiples in Science (1961), in
R. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 343 (1973); J. COLE & S. COLE, SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION IN SCIENCE 12-13, 229-230 (1973); Ogburn & Thomas, Are Inventions
Inevitable?, 37 POL. SCI. Q. 83 (1922)). However, while some discoveries may be made
by others within the term of a patent grant others discoveries may not. Further, without
the incentive of a patent, a later discoverer will be no more likely to disclose his find
than the first discoverer.
21. A trade secret is:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, devise,
method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
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oil would continue. With non-disclosure as the alternative, a patent
grant seems appropriate. The useful arts are promoted by a new mode
of propulsion that does not pollute our skies and whose fuel is abundant
and cheap.
Rumpelstiltskin has also provided society with a technology that was
previously unknown. He has the further advantage of being the true first
discoverer. In the absence of patent protection Rumpelstiltskin would
be unlikely to disclose his secret incantation and method of spinning
gold. He could produce his gold in secret to protect his interests. Since
state trade secret laws are not preempted by the patent laws of the
United States,22 Rumpelstiltskin could even contractually ensure that
any employees maintained his secret. This would contravene the Patent
Act policy of encouraging disclosure of trade secrets.
In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the Supreme Court held that state
trade secret law was not preempted by the federal patent laws. 23 Trade
secret law was deemed inadequate competition with patent law to
interfere with the disclosure of useful innovations. 24 In the case of
those who nonetheless chose trade secret over patent protection, the
Court reasoned that others would independently make the same
discovery or invention soon enough. 25 However, as noted by the
dissent, allowing trade secret protection as a substitute for patent
protection creates a category that receives greater protection-those
whose secrets can be maintained after commercialization.26
Rumpelstiltskin's discovery would fall into this category. Whether or
not trade secret protection should be eliminated with respect to his
invention is another question. However, patent protection seems an
appropriate incentive to promote the disclosure of Rumpelstiltskin's
method and incantation. Society would gratefully exchange a limited
monopoly to Rumpelstiltskin for disclosure of his previously unknown
method of creating gold. The promise of inexpensive and plentiful gold
in the future would be a bargain in exchange for the gamble that another
would discover the method and incantation soon enough.
The naturally occurring chemical that cures cancer is perhaps the most
obvious candidate for patentability under the "promotion of useful arts"
criterion. Mankind's search for a cure to cancer has been both

22. "The only limitation on the States is that in regulating in the area of patents
and copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of the laws in this area passed by
Congress ...." Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 479.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 490-91.
26. Id. at 497 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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exhaustive and expensive. The discovery of a cure would advance our
technology and (like the sea-water engine) perhaps lead to other
beneficial uses of the chemical through further experimentation. The
loss of life caused by cancer would make the exchange of a limited
monopoly for the cure a bargain.
An inherent difference between discovery and invention is that we
discover what previously existed. For example, the chemical in the
Siberian berry always was the cure for cancer. This was simply
unknown before our patent applicant discovered it. It has been argued
that patenting pre-existing subject matter violates the Constitution's
patent clause because it removes technology from the public domain,
thereby retarding, rather than promoting, the useful arts. 27 While this
may be true if items, existing and known, were patentable, it is not true
when items, though existing, are unknown. If the public domain
includes unknown subject matter then everything that may someday be
invented, devised, or discovered belongs to that domain. Even the most
ingenious contrivance is assembled from elements in the public domain.
To grant a limited monopoly over something society did not realize it
had deprives society of nothing. To say that we deprive society of a
chemical that cures cancer, when society did not know of the chemical,
or its curative power, is form over substance.
Discoveries can meet the constitutional purpose of promoting progress
in the useful arts. 28 Patent protection can provide encouragement for
individuals to invest time and resources in making discoveries. Finally,
withholding patent protection may retard progress in the useful arts as
discoverers are left with no alternative to the non-disclosure of trade
secret protection.

IL

THE PATENT ACT

The Constitution authorizes Congress to promote progress in the useful
arts. The mechanism of this promotion is the Patent Act. Congress

27. E. S. M. Kemeny, Computers and Non-Patentable Matter: Rejections under
Article I of the Constitution, 74 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 669 (1992).
28. A discovery can meet the constitutional goal of furthering human knowledge
to the same or greater extent than an invention. Note for example that the "invention"
of the illuminated hula hoop, Patent Number 4,006,556, was patentable while the
"discovery" that ether could be used as a surgical anesthetic was not. Morton v. N.Y.
Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879 (No. 9865) (1862).
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implemented its constitutional authorization in the second session of the
First Congress by enacting the Patent Act of 1790.29 A patent system
has existed in our country ever since. In 1952 Congress codified the act
and that codification remains largely unchanged today.Jo This Comment argues that the distinction of unpatentable discoveries is a judicial
doctrine. Therefore, we begin by setting aside the case law and
analyzing our hypotheticals based solely on the provisions of the Patent
Act and such legislative history as accompanies it.J 1
A. Section 101 Criteria: Statutory Subject
Matter, inventions or Discoveries Patentable
Section 101 of the Patent Act is entitled "Inventions Patentable."J 2
However, section 100 states that "[t]he term 'invention' means invention
or discovery."JJ Section 101, "Inventions [or discoveries]J 4 patentable" provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title."J 5 Breaking down these
criteria of section 101 of the Patent Act, (1) the applicant must have
invented or discovered something, and (2) the something invented or
discovered must be "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter."J 6

29. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, I Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
30. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (West 1988).
31. Much of the legislative history will come from the Congressional Reports
accompanying the 1952 Patent Act, United States Code Title 35, which is still in effect.
S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 ( I 952); H. R. REP. No. I 923, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394 [hereinafter 1952 Report]. The
1952 Act rearranged existing statutory provisions, codified many decisions of the courts
and the PTO, and also made several changes and additions to the previous patent
provision. CHISUM, supra note 13, OV-12.
32. 35 U.S.C. § IOI (West 1988).
33. Under the heading "Definitions," the Patent Act states: "When used in this title
unless the context otherwise indicates----(a) The term 'invention' means invention or
discovery." 35 U.S.C. § 100 (West 1988).
34. The section I00 paragraph, defining invention as invention or discovery, was
added "only to avoid repetition of the phrase 'invention or discovery' and its derivatives
throughout the revised title." 35 U.S.C. § I 00. For the sake of clarity and to avoid any
assumption that discovery is not included in the Patent Act's provisions, the phrase
"invention or discovery" will be repeated throughout this Comment.
35. 35 U.S.C. § 101. The 1952 Report accompanying the Patent Act states that
§ IOI "specifies the type of material which can be the subject matter ofa patent." 1952
Report, supra note 31, at 2398.
36. 35 U.S.C. § 101. Section 101 also allows a patent for any new and useful
improvement and subjects the patent grant to the conditions and requirements of Title
35. Id.
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Under criterion (1), have our hypothetical patent applicants invented
or discovered something? To invent is "to search out or come upon:
FIND, DISCOVER . . . to think up or to imagine ... to create or
produce for the first time. " 37 As for our explorer of Atlantis, while
someone from Atlantis, or elsewhere, thought up and created the engine
for the first time, our explorer did come upon the engine. She discovered it. To discover is "to make known (something secret, hidden,
unknown, or previously unnoticed): EXPOSE, DISCLOSE ... to obtain
for the first time sight or knowledge of ...." 38 The engine was
previously hidden and unknown and our explorer seeks to make known
her discovery under the limited protection provided by the patent clause.
She discovered39 the engine.
If "patent harmonization" legislation were passed, the question of a
previous Atlantis inventor would be moot. Such legislation includes
provisions to change the patent system from "first to invent [or
discover]" to "first to file.'"' 0 The impetus for this change was to
harmonize our system with the rest of the world and take advantage of
a simplified examination procedure. 41 Since our explorer discovered
the engine independently, her discovery would be patentable, provided
she was the first person to file an application.
The same analysis holds for both Rumpelstiltskin and Ipso Facto
Pharmaceuticals, absent the potential difficulty that they were not the
first to discover. They both seek to make known that of which they
were first to obtain knowledge.
The second criterion, that the something invented or discovered must
be "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter," could be further subdivided to require the something invented
or discovered be new, be useful, and be any process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. However, section 102 of the Patent Act,

37. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1188 (Philip B. Grove et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter
WEBSTER'S],
38. Id. at 647.
39. She has invented the engine as well, so far as invent is defined to include
discover.
40. Edward L. MacCordy, The Threat of Proposed Patent Law Changes to the
Research University, 20 J.C. & U.L. 295,296 (1994) (discussing the effect of a change
to "first to file" on research universities).
41. Id.
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defining statutory novelty, amplifies and defines the requirement that
something be new: 42
Paragraph (a) [of section 102] defines the condition that an invention must be
new in order to be patentable. The word "invent," as used in section 101, for
example, does not incorporate "new" within its meaning, but novelty is a
separate requirement. The novelty required is not novelty in an absolute sense,
as the statute defines what is to be looked to in order to show that an invention
is not new. 43

Since section 102 's novelty condition defines "new" as used in section
IO I, and section 101 's term "invention" does not incorporate "new" in
its meaning, the requirement that the machine, manufacture, process, or
composition of matter be new, is wholly and exclusively examinable
under section 102. 44 As for utility, while the Patent Act does not
further amplify or define the requirement that the something be useful,
with some notable exceptions,45 this requirement is generally easily
met, as it is with our hypotheticals.
Section 10 I therefore requires only that the subject matter be invented
or discovered and be any "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter."46 We can classify the sea-water engine as either a
machine or a manufacture. A machine is "an assemblage of parts," "a
mechanical device." 47 The engine is a mechanical device assembled
from parts, and, therefore, it is a machine. A manufacture is "something

42. 1952 Report, supra note 31, at 2399.
43. P. J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-291
(West 1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 161, 178 (omissions in original). Mr.
Federico was the chief examiner of the Patent Office and a principal draftsman of the
1952 recodification. His statements regarding the 1952 act have been cited with
approval by the Supreme Court. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 n.6
(1980).
44. While this analysis stands alone on the statute and legislative history it has also
been upheld by the courts. "Of the three requirements stated in § 101, only two, utility
and statutory subject matter, are applied under§ 101. [I]n 1952 Congress voiced its
intent to consider the novelty of an invention under § 102 where it is first made clear
what the statute means by 'new,' notwithstanding the fact that this requirement is first
named in § 101." In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C. P.A. 1979). "The question
therefore of whether a particular invention is novel is 'wholly apart from whether a
particular invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter."' Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1981) (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 961).
45. See Salim A. Hasan, A Cal/for Reconsideration of the Strict Utility Standard
in Chemical Patent Practice, 9 HIGH TECH L.J. 245 (1994) (addressing the difficulties
of meeting the utility requirement in chemical research claims and arguing for a more
liberal interpretation of chemical utility); and Tim R. Howe, Patentability of Pioneering
Pharmaceuticals: What's the Use?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 819 (1995) (arguing that
the utility requirement makes patenting of research discoveries difficult).
46. 35 u.s.c. § 101.
47. WEBSTER'S, supra note 37, at 1353.
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made from raw materials by hand or by machinery.',4 8 The engine is
made from raw materials by hand or machinery, and, therefore, it is a
manufacture. The engine meets the criteria of section 101 and is
patentable, "subject to the conditions and requirements of [the Patent
Act]."49
Rumpelstiltskin's discovery is a "process" of spinning straw into gold
utilizing a secret incantation. The Patent Act defines process as
"process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." 50 Rumpelstiltskin seeks to patent a new use (creating gold from straw) by means
of a known process (spinning). This is explicitly defined as a process
under the Patent Act. 51
The naturally occurring chemical is not a "process, art or method"
since it is the chemical itself that we desire to patent. Is it made from
raw materials by hand or machinery and, therefore, a manufacture?
"Made" is defined as "artificially produced"52 and "to produce" is "to
bring forward.'' 53 Since the chemical is artificially brought forward
from raw materials (the berry) by hand or machinery it is a manufacture.
The chemical could also be classified as a composition of matter. A
composition is "an aggregate, mixture, mass, or body formed by
combining two or more elements or ingredients."54 The question is
what "combining" requires. If the combining must be accomplished by
the inventor/discoverer, then the naturally occurring chemical is not a
composition of matter. However, if "combining" does not require action
by the inventor/discoverer, then the chemical is a composition of matter
since it is an aggregate, mixture, mass, or body formed by the combining
of elements (molecules combined by nature). To determine whether the

48. Id. at I 3 78.
49. 35 U.S.C. § IOI.
50. 35 U.S.C. § IOO(b).
51. Id. The new use does not make the spinning wheel itself patentable, rather the
process that utilizes the incantation and the spinning wheel to create straw from gold is
patentable, provided the conditions of patentability are satisfied. See Federico, supra
note 43, at 176-177. "[A process] claim is not vulnerable to attack, on the ground of not
being within the field of patentable subject matter, merely because it may recite steps
conventional from a procedural standpoint and the novelty resides in the recitation of a
particular substance, which is old as such, used in the process." Id. at 177.
52. WEBSTER'S, supra note 37, at 1356.
53. Id. at 1810.
54. Id. at 466.
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naturally occurring chemical can be classified as a composition of
matter, we must determine whether the legislature intended this term to
be construed narrowly or broadly. 55
In 1790, the first patent act listed patentable subject matter as "any
useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device . . . [deemed]
sufficiently useful and important."56 The 1793 Patent Act changed the
categories of patentable subject matter to "any art, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter" and deleted the importance requirement. 57
Composition of matter replaced engine or device. The legislative history
surrounding this change is scarce. A logical assumption is that engine
and device were deleted since they were encompassed within the
machine and manufacture categories; composition of matter was inserted
as an additional category of patentable subject matter.
The categories of patentable subject matter have remained unchanged,
with the exception of replacing the word "art" with "process" in the
1952 codification. 58 To determine the proper scope to be given
"composition of matter" we look to the framer's patentability statements.
The framers of the acts stressed the importance of the invention or
discovery, rather than the categories of patentable subject matter.
Jefferson's concern was with a high standard of invention or discovery;
he did not believe in granting patents for small details, obvious
improvements, or frivolous devices. 59 Jefferson wrote: "Being an
instrument in granting the patents, I am acquainted with their discoveries. Many of them indeed are trifling, but there are some of great
consequence ...." 60 The framers were not concerned with whether the
invention or discovery fit into a narrow statutory class of subject matter.
They sought to provide monopoly protection for those inventions and

55. An argument could be made that the categories of patentable subject matter
(machine, manufacture, process, and composition of matter) were not meant to be
exclusive at all, but were rather a "laundry list" of possible categories of patentable
subject matter. While this has been overwhelmingly rejected by the courts, CHISUM,
supra note 13, § 1.01, it has at least been argued that adoption of a system of nonexclusive classes of patentable subject matter would further the constitutional objective
of furthering the progress of useful arts. Margaret E. Anderson, Statutory Subject Matter
in Intellectual Property: Application of the Copyright Scheme to the Patent System, 20
S. TEX. L.J. l 61 (I 979).
56. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, l lO (repealed 1793).
57. Patent Act of 1793, l Stat. 318 (repealed 1794).
58. 35 U.S.C. § l0l. The term "art" as previously used in the Patent Act was
interpreted as practically synonymous with process or method. l 952 Report, supra note
31, at 2398. Therefore "process" (defined to mean process, art, or method in§ lO0) is
used to avoid confusion with the different meanings of the word "art" elsewhere in the
statute and the words "useful art" in the Constitution. Id.
59. Outline, supra note 5, at 67.
60. Id.
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discoveries that met the constitutional purpose of the Patent Act. 61 In
1790, the requirement that the invention or discovery be "sufficiently
useful and important"62 met the framers concern. Today, the Patent
Act's requirements of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness ensure that
the constitutional purpose is met. A narrow reading of the statutory
classes of subject matter is unnecessary to meet this constitutional
purpose.
That the "composition of matter" category should be interpreted
broadly is also evidenced by the Congressional Report accompanying the
1952 Patent Act. That Report stated: "A person may have 'invented' a
machine or manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that
is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101
unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled."63 The report refers to
invented machines and manufactures, and defines their patentability
broadly to include "anything under the sun that is made by man."64
Since the report defines two of the four classes of statutory subject
matter broadly, the indication is that the other two should be broadly
defined as well.
Further, since compositions of matter and processes are not mentioned
in the report, they should not be restricted by the "made by man"
criterion. The report refers to invented machines and manufactures.
While machines and manufactures are typically both man-made and
invented, the same is not true for processes and compositions of matter.
A process need not be made; it can be a means to an end. 65 We grow

6 I. Information about the subject matter of early patents is sketchy because the
records of the patent office were desttoyed in the fire of I 836. Outline, supra note 5,
at 71. However, some of the patents granted under the 1790 act evidence that the
subject matter of patents was not constrained by rigid categorization. The first patent
was granted to Samuel Hopkins in 1790 for "Making Pot and Pearl Ashes." Id. at 71.
Another I 790 patent was granted to Oliver Evans for use of an Archemedian screw for
conveying grain or meal, despite the fact that the Archemedian screw had been used for
centuries to convey water. Id. at 73.
62. Patent Act of 1790, I Stat. 109, I IO (repealed 1793). The sufficiently useful
and important requirement was deleted in the 1793 draft. This made the granting of a
patent merely a clerical matter. Outline, supra note 5, at 8 I. The 1836 Patent Act, on
which the patent laws of today are based, required the application show novelty and
utility.
63. 1952 Report, supra note 31, at 2399.
64. Id.
65. ARTHUR A. MILLER & MICHAEL A. DA VIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL§ 2.3 (2nd ed. 1990).
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old via the aging process. Also, unlike machines and manufactures,
processes are as likely to be discovered as they are to be invented. 66
Similarly, a composition of matter may be composed without the aid of
a person. All but the tiniest subatomic particles are compositions of
matter. Many such compositions are discovered and not invented. If the
1952 Report is to be accepted as a basis for interpreting patentable
subject matter, then its "anything under the sun that is made by man"
language does not stand as a bar to patenting naturally occurring
processes or compositions of matter. Since a composition of matter need
not be made by a person, the naturally occurring chemical that cures
cancer may be properly classified as a composition of matter as well as
a manufacture. The broad definitions of patentable subject matter set
forth in section 101 of the Patent Act are constrained only by the
conditions and requirements of patentability set forth in the rest of the
Patent Act.

B.

Conditions and Requirements for Patentability

Section 101 specifies patentable subject matter. Sections 102 and 103
impose conditions and requirements for patentability.67 Both sections

66. Deviating from the premise that case law will not be used in this Section, it
nonetheless seems important to include a quotation from Diamond v. Diehr: "A new
process is usually the result of discovery; a machine, of invention." 450 U.S. 175, 182
n.7 (1981) (quoting Coming v. Burden, 15 How. 252, 267-68 (1854)).
67. § 102 states: "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless [the patent is not
novel or the person is barred from patenting the subject matter by having made public
use of it for over one year]." 35 U.S.C. § I 02. § 103 states: "A patent may not be
obtained ... if [what is sought to be patented is obvious from what existed before]."
35 U.S.C. § 103. The text of sections 102 and 103 is as follows:
§ I 02 Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless--(a) the invention [or discovery] was known or used by others in this
country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country, before the invention [or discovery] thereof by the
applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention [or discovery] was patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in
this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for
patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention [or discovery], or
(d) the invention [or discovery] was first patented or caused to be
patented, or was the subject of an inventor's certificate, by the applicant
or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the
date of the application for patent in this country on an application for
patent or inventor's certificate filed more than twelve months before the
filing of the application in the United States, or
( e) the invention [or discovery] was described in a patent granted on an
application for patent by another filed in the United States before the
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are exclusionary as they set forth conditions that preclude patentability.68
1.

The Novelty Condition

Section 102(a) denies a patent if "the invention [or discovery] was
known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a
printed publication ...." 69 Since our hypothetical discoveries were
neither known or used by others in this country, nor previously patented
or described in a publication before their discovery, section 102(a) does
not require rejection of the patent application. 70 Since they were not
in public use or on sale in this country more than one year prior to the
date of the patent application, section 102(b) is not a statutory bar. 71
The only section 102 criterion that may be problematic to patentability
is section 102(f). Section 102(f) requires rejection of a patent application if the applicant "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to
invention [or discovery] thereof by the applicant for patent, or an
international application by another who has fulfilled the requirements
of paragraphs (I), (2), and (4) of section 37l(c) of this title before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent [or discover] the subject matter sought to
be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention [or discovery] thereof the invention
[or discovery] was made in this country by another who had not
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of
invention [or discovery] there shall be considered not only the
respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention,
but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and
last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
§ I 03 Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter
A patent may not be obtained though the invention [or discovery] is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if
the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention [or discovery] was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention
was made.
35 u.s.c. §§ 102, 103.
68. Id.
69. 35 U.S.C. § I 02(a).
70. Rumpelstistskin 's process is not the old process of spinning which would
obviously be non-novel. The patentable process is the application of the incantation to
the spinning of straw in order to create gold.
71. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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be patented."72 However, section 100 states the term "invention"
means "invention or discovery" throughout the Patent Act; and this
abbreviation also applies to derivatives of the word "invention.'m The
patent applicants in the hypotheticals did discover the subject matter
sought to be patented so the patent application cannot be rejected under
section 102(f). The hypotheticals meet the novelty requirements of
section 102 and, a fortiori, the "new" requirement of section 101.74

2.

The Non-Obvious Condition

The non-obvious condition of section I 03 requires rejection of a patent
if the differences between it and prior art would have been obvious to
a person of ordinary skill in the art. 75 Prior art refers both to documentary sources (patents and publications) and non-documentary sources
(things known, used or invented in the United States). 76 The Patent
Act of 1952 added section 103 to codify decisions holding patents
invalid, on grounds of lack of invention or lack of patentable discovery. 77 Section 103 requires denial of a patent for an invention (or
discovery) that is new, in the sense that the same thing has not been
made before, if the difference between the new thing and what was
known before it is not sufficiently great to warrant a patent. 78
In the first hypothetical, the secrets of propulsion disclosed by the seawater engine were not obvious to those skilled in the art (engineers,
mechanics) in view of any prior art.
Likewise, prior art in
pharmaceuticals or botany would not lead a skilled person to the curative
properties of the naturally occurring chemical. Similarly, Rumpelstiltskin must establish that his process of spinning straw into gold is not
obvious to those skilled in the art of spinning. The fact that Rumpelstiltskin introduces straw and the secret incantation to the process,
whereby a new result is achieved, makes the process non-obvious.
C.

The Patent Application

Having met the conditions of patentability for invention or discovery,
the patent application must be addressed. A patent application requires
72. 35 U.S.C. § I 02(f).
73. 35 u.s.c. § 100.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44 for discussion of why the § 101
"new" requirement is fully addressed under § 102.
75. 35 u.s.c. § 103.
76. CHISUM, supra note 13, at GI-18.
77. 1952 Report, supra note 31, at 2399; 35 U.S.C. § 103, Historical and Revision
notes.
78. 1952 Report, supra note 31, at 2399.
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a specification, a drawing, and an oath by the applicant stating his or her
belief that he or she is the original and first inventor or discoverer. 79
"The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
... to make and use the same ...." 80 Since a patent is an inventor's
or discoverer's reward for disclosing his or her invention or discovery
to the public, he or she must provide the public with the means to make
use of the invention or discovery after the patent expires.
The specification concludes with one or more claims that particularly
point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention or discovery. 81 The claims define the invention
or discovery for the purposes of applying the conditions of patentability
and the breadth and limits of the patent. 82
The engine application in the first hypothetical would specify the
secret of propulsion and instructions for harnessing that power in an
engine. The claims would cover the engine as a whole, as well as any
subassemblies or parts that also met the requirements of utility, novelty,
non-obviousness, and statutory subject matter. Rumpelstiltskin would
specify the process of spinning straw into gold by use of a spinning
wheel and the secret incantation (which he must disclose). He would
claim a method of producing straw from gold comprising a spinning
wheel (or other like machine) and the incantation. This claim would not
give Rumpelstiltskin exclusive rights to spinning wheels, straw, or gold.
He would only be able to enforce his patent against someone who used
a spinning wheel and the incantation to produce gold from straw.
Ipso Facto Pharmaceuticals would claim the chemical, when used as
a cancer cure as the subject matter of the invention or discovery. 83 The
patent would give it an exclusive right to produce, market, and sell the
chemical for this purpose. The patent application would therefore
79. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (West 1988). A model of the patented subject matter may
also be required. 35 U.S.C. § 114 (West 1988). While the discoverer of the sea-water
engine is not technically the first discoverer----the original inventor also discovered the
engine--in terms of our civilization he would be first.
80. 35 U.S.C. § I 16 (West 1988).
81. Id.
82. CHISUM, supra note 13, § 8.01.
83. While Ipso Facto is not the inventor/discoverer of the cancer cure we assume
that it is the beneficiary of an assignment agreement with its employee discoverer. Such
agreements are authorized under 35 U.S.C. § 261 (West 1988).
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specify the genus and species of the plant that produces the berry, the
berry that contains the chemical, and the molecular structure of the
chemical which cures cancer.84 It should be noted that the claim would
not preempt others from using the plant or its berries for other purposes.
Only the claimed use of the berry's naturally occurring chemical for the
purpose of curing cancer would be protected. After setting forth the
claims, specifications, and drawings, the Patent Trade Office would
examine the applications, and in view of the utility, novelty and nonobviousness of the discoveries, issue the patents.
III.

THE "REQUIREMENT OF INVENTION"

The analysis above referred only to the Constitution, the Patent Act,
and their legislative histories. My clients (and my malpractice insurer)
would surely be disappointed if I did not examine the case law of
patentable discoveries as well. The relevant case law begins with an
early Supreme Court case that made discoveries subservient to inventions
by creating a "requirement of invention."85 The "requirement of
invention" was originally announced in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood. 86 The
novelty of the Hotchkiss patent involved the substitution of materials---porcelain or clay for wood or metal in doorknobs. 87 In the
majority opinion, Justice Nelson acknowledged that the patented
doorknob was better and cheaper than its predecessors; but the improvement did not result from any new mechanical device or contrivance.88
The Court then laid down the rule that 120 years later became the
essence of section 103: "[U]nless more ingenuity and skill ... were
required [in making the invention] than were possessed by an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that
degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every
invention." 89 In Graham v. John Deere Co., 90 the Court addressed the
Hotchkiss "requirement of invention" and section 103. The Graham
Court noted that Hotchkiss "gave birth to 'invention' as a word of legal
art signifying patentable inventions." 91 The application of this "word

84. Id.
85. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248 (I 850).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 265. In Graham v. John Deere Co., the Court noted that one of the rules
of the original patent board of Commissioners was that '"a change of material should
not give title to a patent."' 383 U.S. I, 10 n.3 (1966) (quoting from a Thomas Jefferson
letter to Oliver Evans).
88. Hotchkiss, 11 How. at 266.
89. Id. at 267. Compare this quotation to 35 U.S.C. § 103.
90. 383 U.S. l (1966).
91. Id.atll.
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of legal art," however, had brought about varied opm1ons of its
meaning. 92 The "requirement of invention" was used to hold patents
to an "exacting" standard of invention. 93 Post Hotchkiss patents were
invalidated if they did not result from "a flash of creative genius,"94 or
did not produce "unusual or suprising consequences from the unification
of elements ...."95 The "requirement of invention" invalidated patents
for many discoveries that were not inventions. 96 However, as clarified
by the Deere Court, the Hotchkiss test, codified under section 103, is not
a test of whether the subject matter was invented rather than discovered
but merely focuses the inquiry on the non-obviousness of the subject
matter. 97
IV.

THE CASE LAW OF PATENTABLE DISCOVERIES

The statutory subject matter of utility patents98 consists of product
claims (machine, manufacture, composition of matter) and process
claims. 99 In the hypotheticals set forth above, Rumpelstiltskin's method
of spinning straw into gold utilizing a secret incantation is a process
claim, while the propulsion machine that runs on sea-water and the
chemical found in Siberian berries that cures cancer are product
claims. 100 This Section looks at the treatment of discoveries by the
courts and the Patent Trade Office and analyzes the hypotheticals under
these precedents.

92. Id. at 12.
93. See, e.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.,
340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950).
94. Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
95. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 152.
96. Cuno Engineering Corp., 314 U.S. 84; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 340
U.S. 147; see also cases infra Section IV.
97. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 17 (1966). The Court did not believe
§ 103 changed the general level of patentable invention-only that it properly focused
the inquiry on the non-obviousness of the subject matter. Id.
98. Utility patents are patents for machines, manufactures, process, compositions
of matter, or any improvement thereon. The Patent Act also provides patent protection
for designs and for plant varieties. CHISUM, supra note 13, § 1.01 at 1-7. This
Comment focuses exclusively on utility patents.
99. Id. § 1.02 at 1-8.
100. "A 'process' can be defined as a means to an end. The remaining three
categories (machine, manufacture, or composition of matter) can be defined as ends in
themselves--- 'products."' MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 65, at 21.
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A.

Discovered Processes

The first set of cases deal with the discovery of processes. The
patentee seeks to patent a process that utilizes a discovered property or
principle to produce a desired result. The cases are analogous to
Rumpelstiltskin's discovery.
I.

In re Kemper 101

The case of In re Kemper concerned a patent application that, in its
specification, disclosed the discovery that ice could be kept longer if the
pieces were stored edgewise, rather than flat. 102 The applicant sought
to patent this method of edgewise storage. 103 The patent commissioner
denied the patent and on appeal the circuit court affirmed. The court
reasoned that ice had been placed edgewise by others and questioned
whether the beneficial effect of such placement, now discovered, was
patentable. The Kemper court began by comparing Webster's definition
for both discovery and invention:
Discover differs from invent. We discover what before existed. We invent
what did not before exist . . . . Invention differs from discovery. Invention is
applied to the contrivance and production of something that did not before exist.
Discove~ brings to light that which existed before, but which was not
known.'

The court then held the Constitution and patent laws did not use
discovery in this broad sense, to include disclosure of things which
existed previously. 105 Patentable discovery was synonymous with
invention. 106 The Court stated: "No discovery will entitle the discoverer to a patent which does not in effect amount to the contrivance or
production of something which did not exist before; or, in other words,
to an invention." 107 The beneficial effect of placing ice blocks edgewise was not a patentable contrivance or production. This holding was
both erroneous and unnecessary. Rather than broadly holding that

101. In re Kemper, 14 F. Cas. 286 (C.C. D. of C. 1841) (No. 7,687).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 287.
I 05. Id. at 286.
106. Id.
107. In re Kemper, 14 F. Cas. 286, 288 (C.C. D. of C. 1841) (No. 7,687). The
prevalence of this judicial penchant for equating patentable discovery to invention is
reflected by a leading patent treatise that includes this quotation. ANTHONY W. DELLER,
WALKER ON PATENTS§ 10 at 36 {Deller's ed. 1937) {citing In re Kemper, F. Cas. No.
7,687).
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discoveries that are not inventions are not patentable, the court could
have denied the patent on novelty grounds, the fact that others had
placed ice blocks edgewise (even without realizing the beneficial effect),
meant the claimed method was not new.
2.

Le Roy v. Tatham108

In Le Roy v. Tatham, the patentees discovered that lead could be
wholly reunited after separation, and formed into pipe by introducing
heat and extreme pressure. 109 This property of lead was never before
known and had been believed impossibleY 0 The utility of the resultant product was attested to by the fact that the "product was so much
superior in quality to that made according to the old mode, that it
immediately wholly superseded it in the market." 111 What the patentees claimed as their invention and improvement was not any of the parts
of the machinery but the combination of parts, when used to form pipes
of metal. 112 It was on this claim that the patent fell. The circuit court
instructed the jury that the invention "did not consist in the novelty of
the machinery, but in bringing a newly discovered principle into
practical application .... " 113 The Supreme Court disagreed, requiring
novelty in the claimed combination of parts. 114 Through strict construction of the claim the court did not reach the question of whether the
new property of lead might have been patented. 115

108.

55 U.S. (!4 How.) 156 (1852).
Id.
Id. at 178 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 172.
113. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156,174 (!852).
114. Id. at 177. In dissent, Justice Nelson, joined by Justices Wayne and Grier,
criticized the finding that the new property of lead had not been claimed. Id. at 179
(Nelson, J., dissenting). Justice Nelson concluded that "the claim, in this case, is not
simply for the apparatus employed
... but for the [use] of the newly-discovered property in the metal, and the practical
adaption of it, by these means, to the production of a new result. ... " Id. at 183
(Nelson, J., dissenting). He went on to conclude that such a result should be patentable
and to hold otherwise would unjustifiably grant a patent to the "mechanic" who applied
a well-known principle to produce a new and practical result while denying a patent to
the "inventor" who, in addition, discovered the principle. Id. at 179 (Nelson, J.,
dissenting).
I 15. Id. at 177.

!09.
l l 0.
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The lack of novelty in Le Roy was much more tenuous than in In re
Kemper. Lead had not been reunited by others who had merely failed
to realize the beneficial effect. Yet the discovery of this new property
was not enough, the patentee was also required to devise a novel method
of implementation. As pointed out in the Le Roy dissent, this approach
places the emphasis on the mechanic who tinkers with the process rather
than the true discoverer who discloses the principle. 116 The patentee
in LeRoy discovered a property in lead and utilized his discovery to
achieve a new and useful result. The patent was not upheld because the
method of implementation claimed a non-novel combination of
parts.111

3.

Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary118

While the claims set forth in the cases above were unpatentable on
grounds other than discovery, Kemper for lack of novelty and Le Roy for
an improper claim, the denial of patent protection in Morton v. New York
Eye Infirmary rested solely on unpatentable discovery. In 1862, Dr.
Morton sued for infringement of his patented discovery that ether could
be used as a surgical anesthetic. 119 Dr. Morton's discovery was ranked
among the great discoveries of modern times and he was deemed among
the greatest benefactors of mankind. 120 Nevertheless, his discovery
was deemed to be improper subject matter for a patent and the patent
was held invalid.
Ethers and their intoxicating effect on the nervous system were well
known at the time of Dr. Morton's discovery. 121 Therefore, the
discovery that the inhalation of ether produced total immobility and
insensibility to pain was merely "a naked discovery of a new effect,
resulting from a well-known agent, working by a well-known process."122 As such "[i]t was clearly not the discovery or invention of
an 'art,' or 'machine,' or 'manufacture,' or 'composition of matter.' Nor
116. Id. at 186 (Nelson, J., dissenting). "No Prometheus is welcome in the Patent
Office." Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 435 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
dissenting in part). "It is indeed something of a paradox, but, nevertheless, doubtless
wise, that our patent law gives no reward to the discoverers of scientific principles, while
it protects the discoveries and inventions of lesser minds, who find new, original and
useful applications of such principles." Id. Note that in Le Roy, and Morton, which
follows, the discoverer of the principle also found a new, original and useful application
and was still denied a patent.
117. Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 177.
118. 17 F. Cas. 879 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 883.
12 l. Id. at 882.
122. Id. at 883.
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was it an 'improvement' on any one of the last three." 123 In the words
of the court, patentable discovery depends on invention. 124
In its naked ordinary sense, a discovery is not patentable. A discovery of a new
principle, force, or law operating, or which can be made to operate, on matter,
will not entitle the discoverer to a patent. It is only where the explorer has
gone beyond the mere domain of discovery, and has laid hold of the new
principle, force, or law, and connected it with some particular medium or
mechanical contrivance by which or through which, it acts on the material
world, that he can secure the exclusive control of it under the patent laws. 125

The patent claim in Morton was for an improvement in the art of
surgery. The court, however, insisted upon separating the discovery
from its use, and was thereby left with an old and unpatentable process
of inhaling vapor. 126 The court went on to say "[t]hat this mere
discovery, however novel and important, is not patentable, needs neither
argument nor authority to prove." 127
Dr. Morton claimed the application of ether as an improvement in the
art of surgical operations. This application of ether had not been
previously utilized. The discovery was a new, useful, and non-obvious
advancement in the useful arts. As the discovery of a "practical method
or means of producing a beneficial result," it was a process. 128 The
claim, however, was bifurcated by the court. The discovery of ether's
beneficial effect was not an art, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter or an improvement thereon, and the process of administering
ether (inhalation) was not novel. As a result, the discovery of ether's
beneficial effects in surgical procedures went unrewarded by the patent
system. Presumably, should Dr. Morton (or some future "mechanic")
123. Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879,882 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862)
(No. 9,865).
124. Id. at 881, 882.
125. Id. at 881.
126. Id. at 883.
127. Id. at 882. This Comment reminds the author of a statement made by Judge
Kozinski, of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, during a visit to the University of San
Diego School of Law. Judge Kozinski remarked that one should beware opinions stating
that their assertions are clear or obvious, as this usually indicates that they are neither
and that no support for them can be found.
128. "It is for the discovery or invention of some practicable method or means of
producing a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted, and not for the result or
effect itself. It is when the term process is used to represent the means or method of
producing a result that it is patentable, and it will include all methods or means which
are not effected by mechanism or mechanical combination." Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252,268 (1853).
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"invent" some novel contrivance for administering the ether, a patent
could be issued for that method.
4.

Eames v. Andrews (The Driven Well Cases}1 29

In 1887, the Supreme Court decided The Driven Well Cases. The
patent at issue was the process of constructing wells by driving the well
tube through the ground and into the water below without removing the
earth as was done in the dug or bored wells then in use. 130 This
method created an air-tight seal around the well tube and allowed the
atmospheric pressure acting on the surroundinf water to aid gravity and
bring the surrounding water to the well pit. 13 The other wells of the
time, lacking this air-tight seal, were subject to going dry after constant
use since the atmospheric pressure on the surrounding water was
counter-balanced by the pressure introduced through the open well and
the only remaining force to bring water to the well, gravity, was
insufficient to keep up a constant supply of water. 132
The utility of the process was attested to by the fact that at the time
of the litigation between 500,000 and 1,000,000 driven wells were in use
throughout the United States. 133 In upholding the patent, and granting
a monopoly over this method of creating wells, the Court stated:
The novelty of the process under consideration does not lie in a mechanical
device . . . . It consists in the new application of a power of nature, by which
new application a new and useful result is attained. There is no new product,
but an old product--water-is obtained from the earth in a new and advantageous manner. 134

Under this analysis, the patent was for a process consisting of driving
a tube into the earth to put to practical use the new principle of forcing
water into a well-pit. 135 Those who bore to the water-bearing strata
and then drove the tube downward to secure the airtight connection
which constituted the principle of the driven-well patent were found to
have infringed on the patent. 136

129. 122 U.S. 40 (1887). The attempts to enforce the rights claimed under the
patent gave rise to extensive litigation over validity and infringement which was resolved
by the Supreme Court.
130. Id. at 47.
131. Id. at 49-50.
132. Id. at 48-49.
I 33. Id. at 48.
134. Eames v. Andrews, 122 U.S. 40, 54 (1887) (quoting Judge Benedict, Andrews
v. Carman, I Fed. Cas. 868 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1876) (No. 371)).
I 35. Id. at 55.
I 36. Id. at 70.
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Despite the Court's statement that "[t]he novelty of the process in
consideration does not lie in a mechanical device," 137 the novelty of
the method is the distinguishing factor in the case. The edgewise
placement of the ice blocks of Kemper, the combination of parts of
LeRoy, and the inhalation of Morton, were not novel mechanisms and on
this basis the patents were denied or invalidated. However, in The
Driven Well Cases, the driving of the well-tube was novel and the patent
was upheld. 138 This requirement of novelty in the method, separate
from the discovery, recalls the exacting scrutiny that patents were
subjected to under the Hotchkiss "requirement of invention" test. 139

5.

Algorithms 140

While the cases just discussed were decided prior to enactment of
section 103, which codified the "requirement of invention," the prejudice
against patentable discoveries persisted beyond that time. The evidence
and evolution of that prejudice is apparent from the line of cases dealing
with mathematical algorithms. In Parker v. Flook, the Supreme Court
upheld denial of a patent for a "Method for Updating Alarm Limits" that
involved using a known algorithm and a computer to calculate an
updated alarm-limit value. 141 The Court stated: "The rule that the
discovery of a law of nature cannot be patented rests, not on the notion
that natural phenomena are not processes, but rather on the more
fundamental understanding that they are not the kind of' discoveries' that

137. Id. at 54 (quoting Judge Benedict, Andrews v. Carman, I Fed. Cas. 868
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1876) (No. 371)).
138. Id. at 63-70. For an argument that a patent is allowed where the inventor
claims an entire process utilizing several laws of nature but denied where the inventor
claims his combined use of all the laws of nature utilized, see LIBSCOMB, supra note 4,
§ 2:14 at 154-57 (comparing the Morse telegraph case to Alexander Graham Bell's
telephone patent and others).
139. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
140. A detailed analysis of the problems relating to patenting algorithms and
computer programs is beyond the scope of this Comment. Algorithms are used in this
Section simply to show the court's treatment of what might be considered discovered
processes.
141. 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978). The "alarm limits" were numbers used in a
catalytic conversion process which when reached signalled the presence of an abnormal
variable. The method of updating the limits involved (I) measuring the present value
of the process variable, (2) using a known algorithm and a computer to calculate an
updated alarm-limit value, and (3) adjusting the actual alarm limit to the updated value.
Id.
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the statute was enacted to protect." 142 Prior to Flook, in Gottschalk v.
Benson, the Supreme Court held that a method for converting binarycoded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals was unpatentable
since it "would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in
practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself." 143 An
algorithm was analogous to an idea, therefore, the rule that "an idea of
itself is not patentable" precluded patentability. 144 Unlike Benson,
Flook did not wholly preempt the algorithm. However, since the claim
was essentially directed at calculating and using a mathematical formula
the method was not within the coverage of the Patent Act. 145
Benson and Flook seemed to establish that claims covering a
mathematical formula or algorithm were nonstatutory attempts to patent
a law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea. However, in
Diamond v. Diehr, 146 the Court upheld a process for curing synthetic
rubber, which included in several steps the use of a mathematical
formula and computer, as patentable subject matter under section
101. 147 After reiterating that "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas" 148 were not patentable, the Court held:
(W]hen a claim containing a mathematical formula [unpatentable subject matter]
implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when
considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were
designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state
or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § IO I. 149

Since the process of curing synthetic rubber was patentable, the fact that
the claim included an unpatentable algorithm did not preclude patentability.
Diehr expanded patentable subject matter to include processes that
utilized algorithms. In re Alappat150 found patentable, as a machine,
a device that used algorithms to convert data and display the result on
an oscilloscope screen. 151 The en bane Court of Appeals for the

142. Id. at 593.
143. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
144. Id. at 67 (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498, 507
( 1853)).
145. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 595. Flook came to stand for the principle that
insignificant post-solution activity does not transform an unpatentable algorithm into a
patentable process. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981).
146. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
147. Id. at 191.
148. Id. at 185.
149. Id. at 192.
150. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
151. The application claimed a rasterizer "for converting vector list data
representing sample magnitudes of an input waveform into anti-aliased pixel illumination
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Federal Circuit determined the Benson, Flook, Diehr trilogy were not
intended to create an overly broad fourth category of subject matter
excluded from patentability. 152 Rather, certain types of mathematical
subject matter, standing alone and not applied to some practical
application, were nothing more than abstract ideas and as such were
unpatentable. 153 Since the Alappat invention, as a whole, covered a
combination of interrelated elements (individually performing mathematical calculations), which formed a machine for conversion and display of
data, the invention was not an abstract idea. 154 Rather, it was a
specific machine that produced a useful, concrete, and tangible
result. 155
Under the algorithm line of cases patentable subject matter evolved to
include claims to processes and machines that utilize the laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas inherent in mathematical formulas
and algorithms. With this evolution in mind we return to our hypothetical process, Rumpelstiltskin's method of spinning straw into gold.
6.

The Hypothetical Discovered Process

How do these cases affect Rumpelstiltskin who seeks to patent his
process of spinning straw into gold? 156 Rumpelstiltskin's discovery
relies on the effect produced when an incantation is invoked while straw
is spun on an ordinary spinning wheel. Under the precedent of The
Driven Well Cases 157 we can argue that the novelty of the process
consists of the new application of a power of nature (transformative
power by which straw becomes gold) by which a new and useful result
is obtained. 158 However, since the method of spinning is not novel, his
patent could be denied under the precedents of Kemper, LeRoy, and
Morton. 159 Under Diehr, even if the transformative power of nature
(the incantation/algorithm) is considered unpatentable, its use in a

intensity data to be displayed on a display means.... " Id. at 154 I.
152. Id. at 1543.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1544.
155. Id.
156. The other two hypotheticals, the engine and chemical, are analyzed under the
next Section, addressing product claims.
157. 122 U.S. 40 (1887).
158. See supra text accompanying note 134.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 135-38.
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process which, as a whole, is transforming an article into a different
thing, satisfies the requirements of section 101. 160 This is consistent
with the expanding view of patentable subject matter under the algorithm
line of cases. Also, considering the claim as a whole, the novelty and
non-obviousness requirements are satisfied if we consider the utilization
of straw and the incantation to be sufficiently outside any prior
utilization of the spinning process. It appears I can advise Rumpelstiltskin that his discovered process should be patentable.

B.

Discovered Products

The previous Section examined the case law of discovered processes.
This Section examines the case law of discovered products. The cases
in this Section are analogous to the propulsion machine that runs on seawater and the chemical found in Siberian berries that cures cancer.

1.

Ex parte Latimer 161

In Ex Parte Latimer, the applicant claimed "as a new article of
manufacture the fiber ... , consisting of the cellular tissues of the pinus
australis [tree] eliminated in full lengths from the ... pine-needles and
subdivided into long, pliant filaments adapted to be spun and woven, as
described." 162 The Patent Commissioner noted that plant fibers were
well known and their chemical formulas were the same. 163 On this
ground the Commissioner might have held the patent invalid for want of
novelty. 164 However, despite acknowledging that the "alleged invention" was very valuable and of immense benefit to mankind, 165 the
Examiner's denial of the patent was affirmed on the grounds that the
fiber, freed from its surroundings, was not changed or different from its
natural form. 166
The reference to the "alleged invention" presumes that it is an
invention and not a discovery that is patentable, whether the discovery
is new or not. In a statement showing the confusion of invention and
discovery, the Patent Commissioner stated: "It cannot be said that the
applicant in this case has made any discovery, ... because the mere
160. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981).
161. 1889 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 123 (1889).
162. Id. at 123. A patent was allowed for the process for extracting the fibers. Id.
at 125.
163. Id.
164. Since plant fibers of the same chemical formula had been "known and used by
others" the claimed discovery was not novel under § I 02(a).
165. Ex Parle Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 123, 127 (1889).
166. Id. at 126.
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ascertaining of the character or quality of trees that grow in the forest
and the construction of the woody fiber and tissue of which they are
composed is not a patentable invention." 167 The Commissioner went
on to state that even if this were the first time that man had discovered
plant fiber it would still be old since it was produced by a natural
process. 168 While prefaced as a lack of novelty, the denial rested more
on a concern over granting monopolies to natural products, as evidenced
by the following statement:
Otherwise it would be possible for an element or a principle to be secured by
patent, and the patentee would obtain the right, to the exclusion of all other
men, of securing by his new process from the trees of the forest ... the fiber
which nature has produced and which nature has intended to be equally for the
use of all men. The result would be that an alleged inventor in Germany would
acquire a patent which would give him the exclusive use of the Pinus sylvestris,
the applicant in this case would secure a patent for the fiber of the Pinus
australis, and thus, successively, patents might be obtained upon the trees of the
forest and the plants of the earth, which of course would be unreasonable and
impossible. 169

Whatever nature's intent for the element, it is the discoverer who
discloses its benefits to society. In the situation where something was
not known or used, the discoverer deprives society only of that which it
did not possess, and only for the limited time of the patent grant. If the
constitutional purpose of patent protection is to promote the progress of
useful arts, this purpose is facilitated by disclosure of such discoveries.
Technology and innovation are furthered by disclosures of unknown
natural products. The Patent Commissioner's concern over unrestrained
patenting of the trees of the forest was unfounded. The patent applicant
had not claimed ownership of the trees. The multitude of other uses (i.e.
lumber or firewood) for trees would not be disturbed by granting a
patent on their fibers when used for spinning or weaving. The Patent
Commissioner stated that if the applicant's process had, as a final step,
changed the natural state of the fiber, producing a new or different form,
it could be patented. 110 This requirement, however, does not make the
discovery any more novel or non-obvious in terms of the Patent Act. As

167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 125.
Id.
Id. at 125-26.
Ex Pane Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 123, 127 (1889).
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for utility, a change may in fact make the discovery less useful, while
nonetheless being necessary to obtain a patent. 171
2.

Dennis v. Pitner 172

The exclusion of products of nature from patentability, though
pervasive, 173 has not been uniformly accepted. Dennis v. Pitner
discussed whether an insecticide in extract or powdered form, made from
the root of the cube plant found in South America, was patentable. 174
Here, as in Latimer, 175 the patent involved a product claim to a
naturally occurring substance. The Dennis court stated:
There would seem to be no valid reason or sound support for a position which
would deny to discoveries by researchers in the field of science the protection
of our patent laws when such discovery is that an old, or at least well-known
chemical product, will, acting in a given state, alone, or combined with other
elements or physical elements, produce new, unknown, and unexpected results,
whereas one who puts together at least two old and well-known chemical
substances in certain prescribed proportions and gets new results helpful to man
may receive patent protection. In the latter case, patent protection is universally
accorded to the discovery. 176

The Dennis court recognized the absurdity of denying patent
protection to the discoverer while rewarding the mechanic. 177 It saw
Congressionally authorized patent protection as comprehensive, provided
that inventor or discoverer made a new and useful contribution to
society. 178 This comprehensive scope was evidenced by the Patent
Act's specific inclusion of "inventions" and "discoveries," words that are
171. See Hanellin, supra note 3 (discussing, in part, patent law requirements of
product alteration, or manipulation of claim language, to highlight the manufactured
aspects of the invention).
172. 106 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1939).
173. See CHISUM, supra note 13, § 1.02[7].
174. 106 F.2d 142 at 150. The discussion of this aspect of the case must be
classified as dicta as the patent was held invalid because the court held the patentee was
not the first discoverer of the natural product's use as an insecticide. Id.
175. 1889 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 123 (1889).
176. Dennis v. Pitner, 106 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1939) (citations omitted). The
court goes on to say:
It is true that an old substance with newly discovered qualities possessed those
qualities before the discovery was made. But it is a refinement of distinction
both illogical and unjustifiable and destructive to the laudable object of the
statute to award a patent to one who puts old ingredient A with old ingredient
B and produces a cure for ailment C, and deny patent protection to one who
discovers that a simple and unadulterated or unmodified root or herb or a
chemical has ingredients of health-giving qualities, hitherto unknown and
unforeseen.
Id. at 145.
177. Recall Justice Nelson's dissent in LeRoy, supra note 114.
178. Dennis, 106 F.2d at 146.
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neither synonymous nor intended to be. 179 To deny patentability
because something possessed a property before the discovery was made
is, in effect, to write "discovery" out of the Patent Act. For something
to be discovered it must be present before the discovery can be made.
The Dennis court limited such expressions ofunpatentable subject matter
as "laws of nature," "principles of nature," and "fundamental truths" to
results or functions and not to include the discovery of a new and useful
property of an old product. 180
3.

Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kala Inoculant Co. 181

While other courts have found natural properties to be patentable, the
majority of cases have held that the discovery of a useful natural
property is not patentable. 182 The Supreme Court addressed this issue
in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo lnoculant Co. 183 Kala brought suit
against Funk Brothers for infringement of its patented "inoculant for
leguminous plants comprising a plurality of selected mutually noninhibitive strains of different species of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium,
said strains being unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to
fix nitrogen in the leguminous plant for which they are specific." 184
Prior to the Kala patent, six well-recognized species of bacteria of the
genus Rhizobium were known and used by agriculturists to inoculate the
seed of leguminous plants. 185 However, each species of bacteria was
effective in only a well-defined group of plants. 186 Farmers were
therefore required to use different inoculants on different crops. 187
Mixed cultures had been tried but proved unsuccessful because the
different species of the Rhizobia bacteria produced an inhibitory effect
on each other. The Kala patent claimed the discovery that in each
species of bacteria, strains existed that were not mutually inhibitive.

179. Id. at 145.
I 80. Id. at 146.
181. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
182. In re Kemper, 14 F. Cas. 286 (C.C. D. of C. 1841) (No. 7,687); LeRoy v.
Tatham, 14 How. 156 (1852); Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infinnacy, 17 F. Cas. 879
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865); Funk Bros., 333 U.S. 127.
183. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
184. Id. at 128 n.l.
I 85. Id. at 129.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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Testing could isolate these strains, allowing the production of a mixed
non-inhibitive culture capable of inoculating all of a farmer's crops. 188
There is a distinction between the claims here and those in Ex parte
Latimer189 and Dennis v. Pitner19-0. The latter claims involved only
the natural product itself, freed from its surroundings. The former
combined several natural products in a single culture. This distinction
was sufficient for the Circuit Court of Appeals to uphold the patent on
the grounds that more than a law of nature was involved--"a new and
different composition of non-inhibitive strains which combined utility
and economy to the manufacture and distribution of commercial
inoculants" had been discovered. 191
The Supreme Court invalidated the patent on the grounds that the noninhibitive qualities were not created by the patentee, but rather were the
work of nature and therefore unpatentable. 192 In short, the qualities of
the bacteria pre-existed in nature and the discovery of their beneficial
use in aggregation "fell short of invention within the meaning of the
patent statutes." 193
In a concurring opinion that questioned the majority reasoning, Justice
Frankfurter stated:
"It only confuses the issue, however, to introduce such terms as 'the work of
nature' and the 'laws of nature.' For these are vague and malleable terms
infected with too much ambiguity and equivocation. Everything that happens
may be deemed 'the work of nature,' and any patentable composite exemplifies
in its properties 'the laws of nature. "' 194

Despite Justice Frankfurter's objection to the terms "work of nature"
and "laws of nature" his opinion can not be extended to allow patents
on "products of nature." Justice Frankfurter's rejection of the patent was
based on the fact that the claim covered "a composite culture" but failed
to specify the particular composition of that culture. 195 The "new
property of multi-service applicability" did not exist in nature until the
discover/inventor made the composite. Justice Frankfurter deemed the
requirement of invention met by the discovery of the "new property of
multi-service applicability." 196

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
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Id. at 130-31.
1889 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 123 (1889).
106 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1939).
Funk Brothers Seed Co., v. Kalo lnoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 129 (1948).
Id. at 130.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 135 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Funk Brothers Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 135 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id.
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4.

Diamond v. Chakrabarty197

Funk Brothers appeared to have shut the Patent Trade Office door to
claims reciting the natural properties of products of nature, at least as far
as the Supreme Court was concerned. 198 However, in 1980, the
Supreme Court again addressed the "product of nature" exclusion in the
landmark decision Diamond v. Chakrabarty. 199
Dr. Ananda
Chakrabarty discovered that certain engineered bacteria could be used
more effectively to dissolve oil spills. 200 The "patent claims were of
three types: first, process claims for the method of producing the
bacteria; second, claims for an inoculum comprised of a carrier material
floating on water, such as straw, and the new bacteria; and third, claims
to the bacteria themselves."20 ' The patent examiner had allowed the
first two claims but denied the third (to the bacteria itself), on grounds
that it was unpatentable as (1) a product of nature and (2) living
things. 202
Before determining whether the bacteria was a product of nature, the
Court addressed the question of whether living things were patent-

197. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
198. In Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir.
I 958), product claims for the naturally occurring vitamin B(I 2) were held valid. The
court stated:
There is nothing in the language of the [Patent] Act which precludes the
issuance of a patent upon a "product of nature" when it is a "new and useful
composition of matter" and there is compliance with the specified conditions
for patentability. All of the tangible things with which man deals and for
which patent protection is granted are products of nature in the sense that
nature provides the basic source materials. The "matter" of which patentable
new and useful compositions are composed necessarily includes naturally
existing elements and materials.
Id. at 161-162.
199. 447 U.S. 303.
200. Id. at 305.
20 I. Id. at 305-06.
202. Id. at 306. The Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed the rejection on the
second ground relying on the legislative history of the 1930 Plant Patent Act. The Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals, by a divided vote, reversed on authority of a prior
decision in In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1038 (1977), which held that "the fact that
microorganisms ... are alive ... [is] without legal significance" for purposes of the
patent law.
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able. 203 The issue posed a "narrow question of statutory interpretation"
of whether the micro-organisms constituted a manufacture or composition of matter within the meaning of section 101.204 Noting that
"unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their
ordinary, contemporary common meaning"205 and that courts "should
not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the
legislature has not expressed," 206 the Court found the bacteria patentable as either a manufacture or a composition of matter. 207 Since the
relevant legislative history accompanying the 1952 Patent Act informed
the Court "that Congress intended statutory subject matter to 'include
anything under the sun that is made by man,"' the Court saw no bar to
patenting living matter. 208
However, immediately following the Court's removal of discovered
living organisms from unpatentable subject matter, other judicially
created bars to patentable discovery were reiterated:
This is not to suggest that § I 01 has no limits or that it embraces every
discovery. The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have
been held not patentable. Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new
plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein
could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have
patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are "manifestations of ... nature,
free to all men and reserved exclusively to none".'°'

The inference drawn is that unpatentable subject matter ("laws of
nature," "a new mineral discovered in the earth," etc.) is not patentable
because it is not "made by man." However, the 1952 Report actually
reads: "A person may have 'invented' a machine or manufacture, which
may include anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not
necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of the title
are fulfilled."210 As noted in Section II.A. of this Comment, the
Report's language broadly defines the categories of machine and
manufacture, and by inference the remaining categories, process and
203. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 304 (1980). For a discussion of
patenting life forms, both before and after Chakrabarty, see Edmund J. Sease, From
Microbes, To Corn Seeds, To Oysters, To Mice: Patentabi/ity of New Life Forms, 38
DRAKE L. REV. 551 (1989).
204. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 307.
205. Id. at 308 (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
206. Id. (citing United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, I 99
(1933)).
207. Id. at 309.
208. Id. (quoting from 1952 Report, supra note 31 ). The man-made criteria
established by this paraphrase of the Congressional language was discussed supra,
Section II.A.
209. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citations omitted).
210. 1952 Report, supra note 31, at 2399.
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compos1t10n of matter, should be broadly defined as well. 211 The
constraints on patentability, as noted in the Report, are the conditions of
Title 35: utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and specification. The Court
distinguished the Funk Bros., "handiwork of nature" rejection from Dr.
Chakrabarty's "nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of
matter." 212 "Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new
bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in
nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His discovery
is not nature's handiwork, but his own, accordingly it is patentable
subject matter under section 101."213

5.

The Hypothetical Discovered Products

In view of these precedents and the trend toward expanding patentable
subject matter illustrated in Chakrabarty,214 how are our hypothetical
discovered products' chances at the Patent Office? As for the naturally
occurring chemical, the product of nature exclusion seems to stand
barring the door. While cases like Dennis v. Pitner2 15 would not bar
the claim since its subject matter was new and useful, Funk Bros., 216
and even Chakrabarty, would preclude patent protection because the
chemical was natural. The hypothetical chemical has not been purified
or altered into a non-natural state or form, nor has it been combined with
other pre-existing elements to create a new manufacture or composition
of matter. Therefore, it does not meet the definition of manufacture or
composition of matter imposed by the Patent Office and the courts. The
pharmaceutical company, unless the chemical could be altered or
purified and still maintain its curative properties, would not be protected.
Perhaps the company could hide the chemical amid others in its drug so
that its properties could not be discerned. If this were possible the
curative power of the berry could be protected as a trade secret.
However, as a result, the world would be deprived of the knowledge of
its secret. Other scientists would not be able to experiment with the

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
Id. at 310.

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
106 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1939).
333 U.S. 127 (1948).
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berry's chemical to determine other beneficial uses and under trade
secret protection the monopoly would be unlimited in duration.
The engine from Atlantis would fare better under the judicial
precedent. It is easily classified as a machine or manufacture. It is
novel and non-obvious. While its secret of propulsion might rest on a
law of nature it is the engine and not the natural law that would be
claimed and patented.
CONCLUSION

The Constitution and the Patent Act authorize rewarding inventors and
discoverers with a limited private monopoly. Under the Constitution the
invention or discovery must promote the progress of useful arts. 217
The Patent Act, presumably to ensure that patentable inventions and
discoveries promote the progress of useful arts, sets forth criteria for
patentability. Under the Patent Act, the invention or discovery must be
useful, novel, and non-obvious. 218 The framers of the Constitution and
the original patent acts realized that an incentive to invent and discover
was necessary for the country to prosper. 219 Advancements in the
useful arts (technology, innovation, human knowledge)220 were to be
rewarded whether they were inventions or discoveries. As illustrated by
the hypotheticals, discoveries can meet the Constitution's purpose and
the Patent Act's criteria of patentability.
However, the courts and patent office have at times been less than
enthusiastic in welcoming discovery patents. In In re Kemper2 21 the
court held that discovery was synonymous with invention, in effect
construing discovery out of the Patent Act. 222 In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court announced the "requirement of invention." 223
This "requirement of invention" was limited when codified into the nonobvious criterion of section 103. Understandably, however, many courts
had read a requirement of invention as precluding patentability for
discoveries that were not inventions. 224 The prejudice against discoveries persisted beyond the enactment of section 103. Many of the cases

217. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8 cl. 8.
218. 35 U.S.C. §§ IOI, 102, and 103.
219. See supra text accompanying note 5.
220. See supra Section LB.
221. 14 F. Cas. 286 (C.C. D. of C. 1841) (No. 7,687).
222. See supra Section IV .A. I.
223. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850). See supra Section III.
224. See In re Kemper, 14 F. Cas. 286 (C.C. D. of C. 1841) (No. 7,687); Le Roy
v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852); Morton v. New York Eye Informary, 17 F.
Cas. 879 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865); Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm'r Pat.
123 (1889).
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involved subject matter unpatentable on either novelty or obviousness
grounds. However, in others, patents covering novel and non-obvious
discoveries were denied or invalidated.
A turning point in the Supreme Court attitude toward patentable
subject matter occurred in 1980. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty the court
held that living subject matter was patentable. 225 Diamond v. Diehr
upheld a patent for a process whose novelty consisted of the use of a
mathematic formula. 22 These decisions held patentable subject matter
previously thought to be excluded from patent protection. Subject matter
that could as easily be thought of as discovered as invented. 227 In both
cases the Court stated that we "should not read into the patent laws
limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed."228
Further, the concerns with granting patent protection to discoveries are
overstated. Inventions are not granted patent protection unless they meet
the stringent requirements of the Patent Act: statutory subject matter,
utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and specification. The same criteria
applies to discoveries. The exclusion of laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from patent protection229 often rests on
reasoning that their discoveries are "manifestations of . . . nature, free to
all men and reserved exclusively to none."230 However, there is a
difference when a known law of nature is used to produce a new and
useful result by an old method and when a newly discovered law is
similarly used. In the former case, nothing has been discovered other
than the new effect. In the latter, the hitherto unknown (albeit preexisting) law of nature is disclosed along with its useful effect. Where the
law of nature is disclosed by the discoverer, it cannot be said that a
limited exclusive monopoly takes away from what mankind previously
possessed. While the law of nature is unknown, it is not possessed. A

225. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
226. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
227. In Chakrabarty, a bacteria that fought oil spills was held patentable as either
a manufacture or a composition of matter. 447 U.S. at 309. Diehr's patent was for the
process of curing synthetic rubber. 450 U.S. at 177. A composition of matter or a
process may be more readily thought of as discovered than invented. See supra text
accompanying note 66.
228. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting United States v.
Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
182 (1981).
229. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
230. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
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limited exclusive monopoly grant to the discoverer is exchanged for the
knowledge disclosed by the discovery. This is indeed the purpose of our
patent laws. It bears reiterating that the exclusive monopoly is limited.
After the patent expires the discovery is truly free to all mankind.
Explicit recognition of discoveries that are not inventions as patentable, subject to the conditions and requirements of the Patent Act, would
also preclude some detrimental effects of the present rationale. The
product of nature exclusion to patentability contributes to pharmaceutical
companies' reluctance to research and develop plant derived drugs. 231
A narrow reading of the four categories of statutory subject matter
precludes a natural product from patentability and thereby requires the
discoverer to substantially alter the natural product so that it may be
classified a manufacture or composition of matter. 232 A requirement
of alteration from the natural state may, however, lead a pharmaceutical
company to an alteration that reduces the effectiveness of the product in
order to achieve patentability. Another concern is that the pharmaceutical company will simply decide to keep its discovery a trade secret in
order to protect their investment. 233 This alternative defeats one of the
purposes of the Patent Act---to provide an incentive toward research and
disclosure, so that others may build on the discovery.
While previously there might have been concern over determining who
was the first discoverer, this will be alleviated should the United States
patent system change from "first to invent" to "first to file." When date
of filing determines who is entitled to patent protection, disputes over
who first made the discovery disappear.
In summary, explicit recognition that discoveries that are not
inventions are patentable, subject to the conditions and requirements of
the Patent Act, is appropriate under the criteria of the Constitution and
Patent Act, as well as in view of the trend toward broad interpretation
of the categories of statutory subject matter. Such recognition would
also provide incentive and reward for discoveries that meet the goals set

231. Hannelin, supra note 3, at 173, 174.
232. See, e.g., Farbenfabriken Co. v. Kuehmsted, 171 F. 887 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1909),
affd, 179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 1910) (determining alteration of acetylsalicylic acid to a pure
compound, aspirin, was substantial enough to allow the product to be categorized as a
manufacture).
233. It costs a pharmeceutical company and estimated $100 to $500 million to bring
a new drug to market. Kate H. Murashige, Intellectual Property: Harmonization of
Patent Laws, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 591, 593 (1994). In view of these extreme costs,
protecting the discovery via trade secret law may be preferrable to the risk that any
alteration or purification performed will be insufficient to render the drug patentable as
a manufacture or composition of matter.
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